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H
igh-profile data breaches, some involving 
children’s personal data, resulting from 
insufficient protections built into the 
emerging generation of smart devices, have 
raised urgent questions about whether children’s 
privacy is sufficiently valued in personal data 
regulation. The rapid growth in technologies and 
services whose business model is based on personal 
data collection and analysis – from social network 
services and personalised marketing to learning 
analytics, wearables and home assistants – raises  
yet further concerns. While it is likely that the 
technology industry will get better at preventing 
hacks, it is equally likely to get better at harnessing 
the value – mainly for commercial but sometimes 
public benefit – of the “datafication” of seemingly 
every dimension of people’s lives.
In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) became applicable on 25 May 2018. Several 
years in the making, it has been designed as a 
concerted, holistic and unifying effort to regulate 
personal data at a time when data has rapidly 
become “the new oil” for public, private and third 
sector organisations. As European commissioner for 
justice, consumers and gender equality, Vĕra 
Jourová, put it: “Privacy is much more than just a 
luxury. It is a necessity.” And so, therefore, is its 
protection for all citizens, since “personal data 
protection is a fundamental right in the EU”.
Until recently, talk of the GDPR was rather 
esoteric, confined to deliberations among legal, 
regulatory and technical experts. But spring 2018 
saw the public in Europe and beyond bombarded 
with demands to update social media privacy 
settings and respond to a flood of (sometimes 
inappropriate) email requests to re-consent to 
marketing and mailing lists, all the while hearing 
in the mass media about scandals about political 
microtargeting (especially based on personal data 
illegally collected via Facebook by Cambridge 
Analytica) or fights over the so-called “digital age of 
consent”, as contested across Europe, most notably 
in Ireland and France. All this has brought a 
heightened awareness (and uncertainty), including 
among many parents and children, though 
doubtless unequally distributed, of the new privacy 
regulation and, relatedly, the ways in which 
personal data may be used or misused.
Public awareness matters, not just because of its 
potential to trigger action by policymakers but 
because the public is a key stakeholder in the 
regulation of personal data. Aggregated together, 
public actions and choices in the digital 
environment have significant consequences for 
politics, markets, regulatory effectiveness, equity 
and the direction of socio-technical change. 
But ordinary people’s 
voices are too little heard 
in multistakeholder 
deliberations, 
notwithstanding the 
legitimacy of their 
interests. Children’s 
voices are particularly 
absent, being rarely 
consulted or included in national or international 
deliberations, notwithstanding that they constitute 
a valued and valuable segment of internet users, 
being often pioneering in their adoption of new 
services and experimental in their digital practices, 
yet not easily incorporated into considerations of 
the “population” or the “public” or “users” as a 
generality. This is a problematic omission, because 
child welfare advocates believe it is crucial to take 
steps to ensure that children benefit from the 
wealth of opportunities enabled by the internet, 
now and in the future, without being 
simultaneously exploited, surveilled or “monetised”.
Already there is a host of uncertainties regarding 
interpretation and implementation of the GDPR, 
with stakeholders responding in diverse and 
sometimes misguided ways as they seek to comply.1 
As Britain’s information commissioner observed, 
while “the proper use of personal data can achieve 
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remarkable things”, it is not before but after 25 May 
that “the real journey begins”, with “a lot of work to 
be done along the way”.2 
In this article, I identify some problematic 
actions, unresolved challenges and unintended 
consequences of the GDPR, focusing on children’s 
privacy. I conclude that while the new regulation is 
likely to improve children’s data protection insofar 
as children are treated like other internet users, it 
may make matters worse insofar as they are singled 
out for special treatment as children.
HOW DOES THE GDPR SET OUT TO IMPROVE THE 
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN’S PRIVACY?
Widely billed as a far-ranging, even radical effort to 
give European citizens greater control and choice 
over the uses of their personal data, through 
privacy-by-design, privacy-by-default and governance 
mechanisms, the whole GDPR is too complex to 
summarise here (see instead the guide from the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office, ICO).3 Suffice to 
say that, as regards the information relating to 
identifiable persons, the legislation obliges data 
controllers and processors:
l To process personal data lawfully, securely and 
fairly, in ways that are transparent to and 
comprehensible by data subjects
l To collect and process data and, if they engage in 
profiling, to do so in ways which are limited to 
specific, explicit and legitimate purposes, taking 
account of special provisions for the treatment of 
“sensitive” data (e.g. political views, sexual 
orientation, medical records or biometric data)
l To facilitate individuals’ rights to access, rectify, 
erase and retrieve their personal data under specific 
circumstances
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l To meet a host of governance requirements to 
ensure compliance, informed by the conduct of 
risk-related impact assessments.
These obligations are designed to benefit 
individuals and organisations alike. They will surely, 
therefore, benefit children also. However, the GDPR 
makes some additional requirements in respect of 
children’s data, for reasons set out in Recital 38:
“Children merit specific protection with regard to their 
personal data, as they may be less aware of the risks, 
consequences and safeguards concerned and their rights in 
relation to the processing of personal data. Such specific 
protection should, in particular, apply to the use of  
personal data of children for the purposes of marketing or 
creating personality or user profiles and the collection of 
personal data with regard to children when using services 
offered directly to a child. The consent of the holder of 
parental responsibility should not be necessary in the 
context of preventive or counselling services offered directly 
to a child.”
This rationale contains much of merit, not least 
as it is the first time that the EU has considered 
children’s data as specifically worthy of protection. 
Yet it raises some conceptual and practical issues 
that should, ideally, be grounded in a stronger 
empirical basis than exists at present. These 
concern, first, children’s media literacy (what is 
their awareness of the risks associated with 
personal data processing and of their rights in this 
regard?), second, the harm that the regulation seeks 
to avoid (especially that relating to commercial 
profiling), and third the implied nature of family 
relations (parental responsibility, parental media 
literacy, children’s need for privacy from parents, 
and the readiness of families to act as assumed by 
the regulation).  
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The messy world of real families – who may lack 
time, share devices, have secrets or conflict with 
each other – fits ill with the GDPR’s implied world 
of conscientious parents and dutiful children.  
This has proved particularly fraught in relation to 
privacy, since it may be critical for a child’s 
wellbeing that their access to preventive or 
counselling services does not depend on parental 
consent; yet such a protection is only mentioned in 
Recital 38, and not included in an article (though in 
the UK’s Data Protection Act, a specific clause was 
added to address this).
Although (just) a recital rather than an actual 
article in the GDPR, Recital 38 informs the “higher 
threshold of protection for the processing of 
children’s data”4 specified in Article 8, which  
states that:
1. Where point (a) of Article 6(1) applies, in relation to the 
offer of information society services directly to a child, the 
processing of the personal data of a child shall be lawful 
where the child is at least 16 years old. Where the child is 
below the age of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful 
only if and to the extent that consent is given or authorised 
by the holder of parental responsibility over the child. 
Member states may provide by law for a lower age for 
those purposes provided that such lower age is not below 
13 years. 
2. The controller shall make reasonable efforts to verify in 
such cases that consent is given or authorised by the holder 
of parental responsibility over the child, taking into 
consideration available technology.
In a recent Media Policy Project roundtable at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 
it emerged that Article 8 leaves scope for 
interpretation, indeed confusion, regarding the 
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definition of an 
information society 
service (ISS), the meaning 
of the phrase “directly 
offered to a child”, and 
what higher threshold of 
protection is provided 
over and above the 
requirement of parental consent.1 Also contested in 
the GDPR more generally are the rules on profiling 
children, how decisions are to be made regarding 
the legal basis for processing (including, crucially, 
when it should be based on consent), how parental 
consent is to be verified, and when and how 
risk-based impact assessments should be conducted 
(including how they should attend to intended or 
actual users). Further, it is not clear how, in practice, 
children can claim their rights or seek redress when 
their privacy is infringed unless, perhaps, the 
mechanisms specified in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC Articles 43-54) will be 
made available to them in this context or, 
alternatively, national data protection authorities 
will resource specialised channels both to enhance 
children’s data literacy and to find solutions to 
problems children encounter.
CONTESTATION AND CONFUSION OVER THE  
‘DIGITAL AGE OF CONSENT’
During 2017/18, Article 8 of the GDPR attracted 
considerable attention among the child rights, 
safety and welfare community, sometimes spilling 
over into the public domain, regarding children’s 
rights to protection and privacy online, on the one 
hand, but also to participation, information and 
expression online, on the other (all these being 
rights established in the UNCRC). Since a higher age 
of consent (if not routinely flouted) would favour 
protection rights and a lower age would favour 
participation rights, the stakeholder community 
has been divided in trying to determine where and 
how to strike the optimal balance. 
Adding to the heated nature of this debate is the 
fact that, although the GDPR was designed to 
protect users’ personal data and privacy, personal 
data mediates not only commercial but also 
interpersonal interactions online and, thus, the 
potential harms at issue are not only commercial 
but also interpersonal (such as bullying, 
harassment, hate, grooming); hence the efforts of 
those on the protectionist side of the debate to raise 
the age at which children can use online services. 
Hence, too, the interest of the child safety 
community in whether and how it will now be the 
GDPR rather than safety specific regulation that, for 
instance, specifies the age at which children can 
access services, the conditions under which 
children can request removal of problematic 
content (“the right to be forgotten”) or the 
requirement for parental oversight (via consent 
mechanisms) as well as, more broadly, the 
requirement on platforms to conduct risk impact 
assessments.
This debate played out differently across 
European member states, resulting in all possible 
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AGE OF CONSENT 
ACCORDING TO GDPR ART. 8, BY COUNTRY
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ages between 13 and 16 being chosen as the “digital 
age of consent” (see figure, page 20). It appears that 
these national decisions made little reference either 
to research evidence regarding children’s 
developing media literacy during adolescence or to 
direct consultation with children or child advocates 
regarding their best interests (UNCRC Article 3), 
although internationally all countries apart from 
the US have ratified the UNCRC in which Article 12 
states that the child has a right to be heard “in all 
matters affecting them”. 
So why such different decisions about the age of 
consent? Do we imagine that children mature at 
different rates across Europe? There is little evidence 
for this. It seems more likely that European 
countries vary culturally and politically in how  
they weigh children’s rights to protection and 
participation.5 The result is a notable lack of 
harmonisation across Europe, affecting both 
children and businesses, along with some 
unresolved cross-border issues.
In the UK, a hard-fought debate over the Data 
Protection Bill (now, Act) in the House of Lords and a 
tacit government defeat resulted in an interesting 
compromise – namely, agreeing the age of 13  
(to support teenagers’ participation rights)  
for Article 8 but additionally requiring an “age-
appropriate design code” for online providers for all 
children – as is consistent with the UNCRC Article 1 
definition of a “child” as all those under 18 years old. 
Just how privacy-by-design, itself a principle 
promoted by the GDPR, can be implemented by a 
service provider who may not know whether a user 
is a child or whether they are below a certain age 
threshold, remains to be seen. 
The UK ICO will now produce and enforce a code 
with distinct provisions for children according to 
their age, to ensure that providers fulfil the GDPR’s 
requirements for transparency and interpretability 
(or legibility) of terms and conditions, use of risk 
impact assessments, mechanisms for the right to 
withdraw consent and erase data, and for support 
and redress. Since there is a group able to use online 
services without parental consent (being 13+) yet  
are still in need of child protection (being under 18), 
this places a particular responsibility on service 
providers (and on enforcement of the ICO’s code).
Matters should be simpler for the under 13s, 
insofar as both providers and parents are responsible 
for their internet use. But since many children use 
services underage (51% of UK children have a social 
media profile by the age of 12, despite most 
platforms setting a minimum age of 13),6 and since 
many providers simply require a self-declaration of 
age, the unintended consequence of the regulation 
is that under 13s may appear to providers as adults, 
so missing out on child- (or teen-) specific protections. 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party says: 
“Although the need to undertake reasonable efforts to verify 
age is not explicit in the GDPR it is implicitly required, for if 
a child gives consent while not old enough to provide valid 
consent on their own behalf, then this will render the 
processing of data unlawful.” 7 This raises some 
interesting questions about those services – 
including the most popular social media companies 
– that assume the self-declared age is valid, 
especially when the evidence suggests that 
underage users experience harm online.5 
During April 2018, it became apparent that much 
of the fuss regarding Article 8 was due to a 
widespread misapprehension that this specifies a 
“digital age of consent” relevant to children’s access 
to all online services, rather than only those where 
an information society service is being directly 
offered to a child and where the processing of 
personal data is based on consent. In other words, 
the prefatory phrase, “Where point (a) of Article 6(1) 
applies”, was widely missed. GDPR Article 6(1)  
states the six lawful bases for processing personal 
data (of which consent, point (a), is but one, with 
relevant others including what is necessary for the 
performance of a contract, point (b), and the 
legitimate interests of the data controller, point (f)). 
Such a confusion can be traced to the two 
meanings of consent – first, the requirement on the 
data subject to consent to a service (as when ticking 
“I agree” to terms and conditions) and, second, the 
data controller’s decision to rely on consent as the 
lawful basis for processing personal data. This 
confusion will surely extend to users who are 
unlikely to distinguish consenting to a service to 
gain access to it (for instance, when signing up to 
Facebook) from the lawful basis on which their data 
is processed. 
In the run up to 25 May 2018, as users were 
required to update their privacy settings, it became 
apparent that not only have different member states 
adopted different approaches as regards children, 
but so too have different providers:
l Facebook appears to be keeping the age of 13 as 
the minimum to use the service (as long required  
by COPPA – the US Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act 1998) by processing personal data  
on the lawful basis of contract (for adults and 
teenagers if permitted legally to make a contract in 
their country), and on the basis of legitimate 
interest (for teens 13+ not permitted to make a 
contract). Additionally, it processes sensitive data 
and profiles users (as defined by GDPR Article 9)  
on the basis of consent (thus applying EU member 
states’ different ages of consent for Article 8 only  
in relation to sensitive data and targeted 
advertising)8
l WhatsApp (owned by Facebook but taking a 
different approach) announced that it would 
henceforth restrict its services in Europe to those 
aged 16+ (based on a simple self-declaration of age), 
thus obviating the need to collect information 
about age and so enabling data minimisation9
l Instagram (also owned by Facebook) began asking 
its users if they were 18+, stating this affects the use 
of their data for targeting adverts (i.e. profiling), 
though it also has implications for the safety 
provisions applied for 13-17 year olds
l Twitter invited users (at least in the UK) to agree 
that they’re over 13 years of age, also removing 
some users believed to have been under 13 when 
they first signed up to the service. 
The implications for children now deemed 
underage – in the UK, 55% of 12-15 year olds use 
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Facebook, 43% use Instagram and 24% use 
WhatsApp6 – are only now emerging. It would be 
problematic if children were to be faced with the 
decision either to lose access to a service they value 
or to lie about their age to retain access (and, 
thereby, find themselves treated as an adult rather 
than benefiting from the protections due to them as 
a child). The position for their parents is also 
problematic, for they would surely wish their child 
could engage honestly online while in receipt of 
appropriate protections but, instead, are likely to 
find themselves complicit in various workarounds 
so their child can access services. 
The legal implications are also unclear. For 
instance, whether Facebook’s decision to process 
personal data partially on the basis of legitimate 
interests, itself unexpected to many, may prove 
unsustainable given the upcoming revision of the 
EU’s e-privacy directive, in which legitimate interest 
is currently not foreseen as a ground for tracking or 
profiling.10 Then there are the legal challenges, such 
as that brought by Austrian privacy activist Max 
Schrems11 – on the grounds that the all-or-nothing 
consent required by key companies constitutes 
illegal “bundling” and “forced consent”,12 contra the 
intention of the GDPR to empower internet users 
with transparent, graduated and genuine choices in 
the uses of their personal data. 
Last, it’s noteworthy that UNICEF asserts: 
“Although other legal bases for data processing may 
exist, obtaining free and informed consent is the 
approach most consistent with children’s rights.”13 
This would mean, however, that the age of consent 
shown in the figure on page 20 would apply to 
teenagers’ use of all of a social networking service, 
as originally expected by many, in most countries, 
thereby protecting them but also restricting their 
participation for longer.
WHAT IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RESEARCH WITH 
CHILDREN AND PARENTS?
There are many questions that have been – and 
should yet be – researched regarding the views and 
understandings of children and parents as regards 
the complex and changing digital environment in 
general and privacy in particular. Here I select just 
two indicative sources of evidence regarding 
children’s developing competence, both of which 
suggest the inadequacy of a regulatory approach 
that seeks to protect children’s data via 
implementation of a rigid age threshold.
Ofcom, the UK regulator, asked a nationally 
representative sample of UK children to respond to 
the statement, “When you use Google to look for 
something online, you are given a list of websites in 
the Google results page”, and to choose from the 
answer options shown in the figure below, with the 
top green line being the “right” answer.14 The results 
suggest that with increasing age, children gain the 
commercial literacy to realise that some but not  
all search engine results can be trusted. However, 
there is no strong increase in understanding 
through the early teens, the main gain being among 
younger children. 
One might conclude that 13 year olds are almost 
as literate as 16 year olds (it being younger internet 
users who lack commercial literacy). Development 
in understanding thereafter (ages 16-21 and, using 
other indicators, for older ages also) is variable, 
offering little evidence of a magic switch in 
maturity when children turn 13 (or 16) and so 
hardly justifying setting an age threshold as a 
“bright line rule”15 by which those in need of 
greater protection can be identified.
The Parenting for a Digital Future project asked a 
nationally representative sample of UK parents to 
answer the question, “At what age do you think your 
child will be or was old enough to make their own 
decisions about the websites or apps they use?” This 
is a view of their child’s “age of independence”, as 
they were asked to assess their child’s maturity 
rather than to consider the legal question of 
consent. The average age chosen by parents of 
children aged 0-17 was 13, although the most 
common answer (the mode) was 16. But as shown  
in the figure on page 23, what was more striking 
was that parents’ views vary greatly according to 
the age of their child.16
So, while parents of young children consider 13 a 
reasonable age, parents of teenagers take a different 
view, clearly thinking that they should stay involved 
in their children’s decisions about internet use. 
Parents of teenagers aged 13 to 17, therefore, think 
that the UK government’s chosen age of consent of 
13 is too young: 79% of this group think their child 
should be at least 14 before making decisions about 
whether to consent to online services, with the ideal 
age of consent averaging 15. Also interesting was the 
finding that more digitally skilled parents such as 
those able to create their own websites or videos and 
parents who have had negative online experiences 
also favoured an older age of consent.  
ADVANCING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
In a digital age in which children’s every 
communication and action is tracked and recorded, 
it is becoming clear that privacy (UNCRC Article 16) 
is vital to children’s “best interests” (UNCRC Article 
3) and their opportunity to develop to their full 
potential (Article 29). Increasingly, digital privacy 
mediates children’s negative rights – the avoidance 
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of harm, insofar as infringements of privacy place a 
child at risk, and also their positive rights, “insofar 
as it is part and parcel of individual autonomy, a 
necessary precondition of participation”.17 With the 
ink not yet dry on the GDPR nor on the policies of 
public and private sector organisations designed to 
implement it, it is too soon to be sure whether 
children’s rights will be fulfilled or, at worst, 
undermined by a regulation that only partially 
takes account of their specific needs and 
circumstances. 
At present, the lack of harmonisation across 
countries and services (itself counter to the EU’s 
goal of easing the regulatory burden on businesses 
while improving clarity and accountability for 
users) combined with the practical ease of 
circumventing protections provided for those of 
different ages and continued legal uncertainties 
over implementation, is creating an unsatisfactory 
regulatory context.
In the future, it is possible that the public may 
make different choices in managing their privacy 
online as they gain what we might call “data 
literacy”. This term has been variously defined by 
different disciplines18 but should now capture not 
only a knowledge of data processing but also a 
critical understanding of data flows and the data 
lifecycle. But data literacy, like media literacy and 
other literacies, always depends on legibility: people 
cannot “read” or understand or responsibly engage 
with that which is illegible. 
Hence the GDPR, and the “datafication” of society 
more generally, is accompanied not only by insistent 
calls for the mainstreaming of media literacy 
education and awareness-raising, but also for 
policymakers to enhance data controllers’ public-
facing mechanisms, including transparency, 
accountability and redress. Some of these 
requirements are built into the GDPR, but some 
must be engineered by the state, business or wider 
society to support, complement or enforce the 
implementation of the GDPR if personal data is to 
be protected effectively. 
As with the canary in the coal mine, children 
often find themselves in the vanguard of digital 
innovation and their problematic experiences of 
privacy online turn out to indicate problems also 
significant for the wider population. After all, it is 
not only children who do not read or understand 
terms and conditions, not only children who are 
prepared to trade their personal data for free 
services, and not only children who struggle in 
practice to exercise their right to protect or retrieve 
or delete their data. 
As I argued recently, one problem with the 
problem of treating children as a special subgroup 
is that this conjures a problematic normative vision 
of all other users as somehow invulnerable and 
invincible.19 Not only is this wrong (for user 
vulnerabilities extend far beyond childhood) but, 
once provision has been made for some, further 
calls for special protection are likely. 
In future, it may work better for data controllers 
to protect the rights (and limit the commercial 
exploitation) of all users than to try to identify 
children (and other vulnerable users) so as to treat 
them differently (not least because the very process 
of identifying children may undermine the 
principle of data minimisation which protects  
their privacy). Designing systems for the minority of 
users who are white, educated, middle-aged, 
able-bodied and resilient may prove unwise and 
expensive in the long run, as well as counter to 
many people’s rights. 
In other words, it may be that a governance 
regime that treats children fairly will be one that 
works for everyone, and it may also prove more 
efficient and effective than one that addresses 
(some) adults’ needs first and then tacks on 
children’s as an afterthought.
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